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1. Introduction
Environmental goods and services are now being largely provided by a sizeable and
fast-growing specialized industry. Over the last 40 years, this so-called "eco-industry"
has come to rival the aerospace and pharmaceutical sectors in size, accounting for about
1.7% of employment and 2.2% of gross domestic product in the European Union and the
United States at the present time, and totalling expected global revenue of US$ 776 billion
in 2010 and US$ 800 billion in 2015.1 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development and the Statistical Oﬃce of the European Commission [OECD/Eurostat
(1999)] define the eco-industry as the set of “(...) activities which produce goods and
services to measure, prevent, limit, minimize or correct environmental damage to water,
air, and soil, as well as problems related to waste, noise and eco-systems. These include
cleaner technologies, products and services which reduce environmental risk and minimize
pollution and resource use.” Pollution abatement goods, services and technologies make up
more than 80% of the industry’s income [Institut Français de l’Environnement (2002)].
According to the OECD (2002), current growth is driven by demand from the private
sector: the Institute of Clean Air Companies (ICAC), for example, an American nonprofit
association of enterprises supplying stationary-source air pollution control technology and
monitoring systems, recently projected that its United States market will hover around
US$ 7 billion a year through 2010, the largest segments remaining those for SO2 and NO
technologies which essentially address the needs of privately-held industrial units.
1

For additional figures and trends concerning the eco-industry, together with a short history of the
sector and a discussion of its definition, see Sinclair-Desgagné (2008).
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In sum, polluters rely more and more on external suppliers for the goods, services and
technologies necessary to comply with environmental laws and regulations; this especially
happens in dealing with air pollutants, wastewater and solid-waste. Experts and practitioners allege that polluting firms can thereby focus on their respective core business,
access leading expertise, and share risk [see, e.g., Miladin (2005), Blocki (2002), Shelley
(1997)]. This paper’s objective is to formally examine such rationales and dig out the
circumstances in which they hold.
Our analysis draws from the early literature on vertical integration. We find, for
instance, that polluting firms will do less in-house abatement and increase outside procurement of environmental goods and services as their product market expands. This corroborates Stigler (1951)’s (and Adam Smith’s) well-known prediction that “the division
of labor is limited by the extent of the market.” It also supports the above “core-business”
explanation. The result is guaranteed to hold, however, only when the production and
abatement technologies meet specific conditions which are spelled out below.
Our modelling approach builds additionally on the emerging theoretical environmental
economics literature which studies the eco-industry [see, e.g., David and Sinclair-Desgagné
(2009, 2005), Requate (2005), Greaker and Rosendhal (2008), David et al (2008), Canton
et al. (2007), Nimubona and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005), Perino (2009)].2 This work has
so far centered primarily on the policy consequences of imperfect competition between
abatement suppliers. It acknowledges the existence of the eco-industry and is essentially
2

A survey of this literature can be found in Sinclair-Desgagné (2008).
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normative in scope. By contrast, this paper chiefly constitutes an essay in positive economics that seeks to explain the extent of the eco-industry.
The following section will now present a simple (partial equilibrium) model of the
market for abatement. On this basis, Section 3 uses comparative statics to analyze a
polluting firm’s decision to increment its external procurement of abatement goods and
services. Section 4 outlines some policy implications. Section 5 finally highlights this
paper’s main findings, pointing out specific traits of abatement outsourcing that do not
fit the current theory of vertical integration and would call for further investigation. All
mathematical assumptions and derivations are summarized in an appendix.
2. The model
Imagine a representative firm subject to a tax on its polluting emissions. To alleviate
the fiscal burden, this firm might expend in-house eﬀorts in controlling emissions and/or
procure abatement goods and services from an external supplier (the abater). Thereafter,
we assume the latter is a monopoly, while the polluting firm is a price-taker on both the
output and pollution abatement markets. This setting is that of a young abatement goods
and services industry; paraphrasing Stigler (1951, p. 188):
With the expansion of the [polluting] industry, the magnitude of the [emission
control] function subject to increasing returns may become suﬃcient to permit
a firm to specialize in performing it. The [polluting] firms will then abandon
[at least part of] the [pollution abatement] process and a new firm will take
it over. This new firm [here, the abater] will be a monopoly (...). With the
continued expansion of the [polluting] industry, the number of [abatement
supplying] firms will increase, so that the new [abatement] industry becomes
competitive (...). [Italics and terms between brackets added]
It also seems to fit several stylized facts about the abatement goods and services market.
4
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The Texas Center for Policy Studies reports, for example, that:
"Area sources" are small, stationary sources that usually do not emit large
amounts of criteria pollutants or toxics. (...) Important area sources include
dry cleaners, printers, machine shops, service stations, wastewater treatment
plants, auto painting, repair shops and consumers who use household consumer
items. While these "small" businesses and consumer activities individually do
not contribute large amounts of pollution to the atmosphere, taken collectively
they emit more of some types of pollutants than do some individual large
industries. In many cities in Texas, area sources contribute more VOCs to
smog formation than do major stationary sources.
Meanwhile, the Institute of Clean Air Companies often displays only one supplier of
certain technologies to abate volatile organic compounds (VOCs).
Let us now describe formally the polluter’s and the abater’s respective behavior.
◦ The polluting firm
Let the representative polluter set its production level , internal abatement eﬀort 
and quantity of procured abatement goods and services (AGS)  from the interval [0 ∞)
in order to maximize the profit function
 (  ) =  ·  − ( ; ) −  · (  ; ) −  ·  .

(1)

The letters , , and  refer respectively to the price of output, the emission tax level
and the price of outsourced AGS. The function ( ; ) gives the cost of production;
it is indexed by an exogenous parameter  and is assumed to be twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, increasing and convex in  and  (so the first and second-order derivatives
 ,  and  ,  are positive). The expression (  ; ), finally, also indexed by an
exogenous technical parameter , denotes the firm’s emission function; all other things
remaining constant, it increases, and increases faster, with the quantity produced  (so the
first and second-order derivatives  and  are positive) but goes down, at a decreasing
5
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rate, as the abatement expenses  and  get larger (so  ,   0 and  ,   0).
To be optimal, ,  and  must then satisfy the necessary and suﬃcient first-order
conditions given by
 =  −  −  ·  5 0

(= 0    0)

(2)

 = − −  · 

5 0

(= 0    0)

(3)

 = − ·  − 

5 0

(= 0    0)

(4)

Expression (2) says that the emission tax  should not be so high if any production is to
take place. Expressions (3) and (4), on the other hand, mean that some positive penalty
(  0) is necessary to induce abatement eﬀorts (   0). If  5  , moreover (so
the abater’s technology does not curb emissions better than the polluter’s own abatement
expenses), AGS outsourcing does not occur (i.e.  = 0) when the price  is greater that
the marginal cost  of in-house abatement (for in this case:    = − ·  = − ·  ).3
Assuming thereafter that    (so an additional unit of outsourced AGS reduces
emissions more than an additional unit of in-house abatement eﬀort), condition (4) now
yields the inverse demand for AGS:
 = − ·  (  ; ).

(5)

Demand is enhanced, naturally, by a larger emission tax . As stressed by Canton et al
(2007), it also depends on the relative eﬀectiveness of abatement technologies, which is
captured here by the second-order derivatives       and  . The curvature  ,
in particular, plays a key role that we shall now spell out.
3

When    , however, it may happen that   0 while    . This qualifies Stigler (1951, p.
188)’s assertion that the new AGS supplier "(...) cannot charge a price for the process higher than the
average cost of the process to the firms which are abandoning it."

6
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◦ The pollution-abatement supplier
The AGS provider’s profit, on the other hand, can be written as
() =  ·  − (;  ) ,

(6)

where (;  ), indexed by the exogenous parameter  and assumed increasing and convex
in  (so  and  are positive), stands for the cost of bringing an amount  of AGS to
the market. Substituting the polluting firm’s demand (5) in the latter expression yields
() = − ·  (  ; ) ·  − (;  ) .

(7)

Suppose that the function (  ; ) is "moderately" convex in , so the product  ·
is decreasing in . Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a profit-maximizing delivery of
AGS are then
 = − ·  ·  −  ·  −  5 0

(= 0    0) .

(8)

This entails that the unit price for a positive quantity of AGS will be
 =  +  ·  ·  ;

(9)

it is equal to the marginal cost at  plus a positive term proportional to the tax level ,
the quantity  and the curvature  . Using (9), one gets the familiar expression for the
markup of a monopolistic supplier:
 ·  · 
1
 − 
=
=
,



where  =




(10)

· 1 is indeed the price-elasticity of demand for AGS. A lower elasticity,

induced for instance by a higher tax , allows therefore the abater to charge a higher
markup (all other things remaining the same).
7
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David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) pointed out that the price-elasticity  goes
down with , so a bigger emission tax grants the AGS supplier more market power.4 This
assertion remains on the whole valid here, but the possibility polluters have to abate their
emissions in-house calls for some qualifications.5
3. Results
Let us now investigate how in-house abatement eﬀorts  and the amount of outsourced
AGS  respectively vary when circumstances are diﬀerent. We assume that no situation
causes a firm to exit; in other words,   0 and   0 throughout the current exercise. We
also suppose that polluters always perform some (even tiny) emission control themselves,
so   0. Conditions (2), (3), (4) then hold as equalities. Total diﬀerentiation of these
conditions, taking into account that the price  of AGS is set via formula (9), gives
⎤⎛
⎞
⎡
− · 
⎢ −( +  ·  ) −( +  ·  )
⎢
⎢
⎢ −( +  ·  ) −( +  ·  )
− · 
⎢




⎢
⎣
−( +  ) −( ·  +  ) −( ·  +  )
⎡

⎥ ⎜  ⎟
⎥⎜
⎟
⎥⎜
⎟
⎥ ⎜  ⎟
⎥⎜
⎟
⎥⎜
⎟
⎦⎝
⎠



⎢ −1 0 
⎢
⎢
= ⎢
0 

⎢ 0
⎢
⎣
0  0  + 

⎛

⎜
⎤⎜
⎜
⎜
 · 
⎥⎜
⎥⎜
⎥⎜
⎥⎜
 · 
⎥⎜
⎥⎜
⎦⎜
 ·  +  ⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝

⎞

 ⎟
⎟
⎟
 ⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
 ⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
 ⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠


(11)

4

David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005, p. 141) actually made a more general statement: "(...) each
regulatory instrument (emission taxes and quotas; design standards; and voluntary agreements) has a
specific impact on the price-elasticity of the polluters’ demand for abatement services, hence on the
market power of the eco-industry and the resulting cost of abatement."
5
Qualifications are also necessary if other suppliers can enter the market for AGS. This case was
recently examined by David et al (2008).

8

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper534

8

Nimubona and Sinclair-Desgagné: Polluters and Abaters

Following standard comparative statics practice, the respective impact on , , and
 of a change in the output market price , the abater’s and the polluter’s respective
cost parameters  and  (to be given precise meaning below), the emission tax  and the
emission control index , which is captured by the derivatives

   
, , ,
   

,...,


,


can

now be assessed using Cramer’s rule. Note beforehand that concavity of the polluting
firm’s objective requires that the determinant of the 3x3 matrix on the left-hand side,
noted 3 , be negative, and the determinant
¯
¯
¯ −( +  ·  ) −( +  ·  )
¯




2 = ¯¯
¯ −( +  ·  ) −( +  ·  )
¯





¯
¯
¯
¯
¯ = ( +  ·  )( +  ·  ) − ( +  ·  )2
¯
¯
¯

be positive. This completes the mathematical preliminaries to investigate some commonly
stated rationales for outsourcing AGS.
3.1 More outsourcing of abatement makes compliance cheaper
An obvious reason to switch from in-house to externally provided AGS is that the
latter are less expensive. Suppose indeed that an increase in the technical parameter 
indicates that the marginal cost of making AGS is lower; i.e.   0. Formula (9) implies,
then, that   0; in other words, the market price of AGS goes down. By Cramer’s rule
and the above remark, it follows that



= − [ · 2 ]  0 ,


(12)

so the quantity of procured AGS increases, as expected.
Cramer’s rule and the fact that 3  0 imply, moreover, that
9

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2011

9

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 534 [2011]




= − [− (( +  ·  ) −  ( +  ·  ))] .


(13)

One might reasonably assume that  and  are negative, so taking more abatement
measures (in-house or outsourced) reduces the environmental impact of production, and
that   0, so raising in-house abatement eﬀorts increases the marginal cost of production (because managerial time and attention, say, are scarce resources). The sign of




then depends on that of the sum  +  ·  and the cross-derivative  .
A positive  would mean that internal and outsourced AGS are substitutes: more
of the latter renders the former less eﬀective (recall that  ,   0). In this case, if
the marginal benefit of in-house abatement in terms of tax reduction − ·  does not
compensate for its cost  (i.e.  +  ·   0), then




 0, so in-house abatement

certainly decreases when procured AGS are cheaper. A negative  , on the other hand,
portends complementary instruments: more of one enhances the other’s performance at
reducing emissions (as in several cases actually reported by the ICAC). If, additionally,
the opportunity cost of internal resources is relatively small compared to fiscal benefits
(i.e.  +  ·   0), then




 0. In other circumstances, the sign of




is ambiguous.

The following proposition summarizes these findings.
Proposition 1: Suppose the marginal cost of external abatement goes down (i.e.  
0). This entails that the market price of AGS decreases, so more abatement eﬀort will
be outsourced. On the other hand (provided  ,   0 and   0), there will be less
(more) internal abatement if internal and outsourced AGS are substitutes (complements)
and in-house abatement brings more (less) costs than benefits at the margin.
10
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The second sentence suggests that total abatement eﬀort (external plus in-house)
might actually decrease if the eco-industry becomes more eﬃcient at making abatement
goods and services. Indeed, with  =  +  denoting total abatement eﬀort, we have
after some algebra that
 

=
+



⎡
⎤
(+)
(−)
(+)
(+−)
z
}|
{
z
}|
{
z
}|
{
z
}|
{
(−)
 ⎣( +  ·  )( ·  −  −  ·  ) + ( +  ·  )( +  ·  −  ·  )⎦
=

3



which is negative if and only if  +·( − )  0, i.e. if  is large enough (so internal
and external abatement are strong substitutes). This seems to run counter to traditional
wisdom, which rather expects that a lower marginal cost of abatement (all other things, in
particular the emission tax, remaining the same) means greater eﬀort will be expended at
reducing pollution. What we did here, however, was to enter the “black box” of pollution
abatement, considering it normally has two components - internal and outsourced - with
diﬀerent marginal costs; an uncompensated change in only one of the latter may then
lead polluters to reallocate their abatement eﬀort in ways that can surprise an outsider
who sees only the aggregate.
3.2 More outsourcing of abatement allows to curb emissions more eﬀectively
Another natural argument to justify greater outsourcing of AGS is that this provides
access to leading expertise and state-of-the-art technology.6 In the present model, the
6

For (albeit preliminary) evidence, the interested reader may have a look at the various case studies
reported on the ICAC’s website (www.icac.com).
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parameter  can be used to indicate the quality of the technology available on the market:
let  =  = 0 and  ,   0, so a larger  strictly means that procured AGS are
more eﬀective and experience less decreasing returns at controlling emissions. The pricing
formula (9) then implies that  =  ·  ·   0, so the market price of AGS goes down
when  grows (and demand for abatement is thereby more elastic). Cramer’s rule now
entails that



= − [( ·  +  )2 ]  0 .


(14)

Better returns on external abatement therefore augments AGS outsourcing, as predicted.
The eﬀect of a greater  on in-house abatement eﬀorts, in contrast, depends again on
the relationship between , , , , and . We have that



= − [−( ·  +  )(( +  ·  ) −  ( +  ·  ))] .


(15)

In the previously mentioned scenario where   0 (in-house and outsourced abatement
are substitutes) and  +·   0 (internal resources devoted to abatement carry a large
opportunity cost), the derivative




is (rather intuitively) negative. It wears the opposite

sign if   0 (in-house and outsourced abatement are complements) and  +  ·   0
(internal resources devoted to abatement give rise to a significant fiscal benefit). Its sign
is ambiguous otherwise.
These developments support a second proposition.
Proposition 2: Suppose the external abatement technology improves (meaning that  ,
  0). Polluting firms will then buy more abatement goods and services. However
(provided  ,   0,   0), there will be less (more) internal abatement expenses
12
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if these are substitutes (complements) to outsourced AGS and the opportunity cost of inhouse abatement is at the margin larger (smaller) than its benefits.
This proposition is analogous to the previous one and calls for the same observations.
It underscores again the importance of entering the “black box” of abatement, in order
to better understand and predict the overall eﬀorts made by private firms to meet their
environmental constraints.
3.3 More outsourcing of abatement brings more focus
Having an outside supplier take care of emission control clearly allows polluting firms
to concentrate on their core business. This corroborating statement from Blocki (2002) is
typical in the professional literature on the subject: "The primary benefit oﬀered by an
abatement contractor is focus. The plant and its staﬀ are focused on getting the product
out the door and keeping the production equipment operating. An abatement contractor
has no focus on the client’s production; its only focus is the abatement system." The
latter sentence suggests a setting with no technical synergy between in-house and external
abatement; accordingly, let’s assume that  = 0, so  = 0 by formula (9).
Suppose now that the polluting firm finds it more costly to produce when more managerial time is put on controlling emissions; i.e., in formal terms,   0. And let a larger
parameter  aﬀect only the marginal cost of internal abatement, meaning that the marginal cost of in-house abatement has gone up; that is,  = 0 and   0. By Cramer’s
rule, the derivative




is such that




= − [ ( +  ·  )( +  )] .


(16)
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Let  be large enough so that  +·  0. If   0 as before, the sign of




depends

on the value of  =  ·  · , which captures the change in returns on outsourced AGS
as output increases. A negative value, showing (rather realistically) that the returns on
the abater’s extra eﬀorts are less decreasing at higher production levels, implies indeed
that




 0.

In a similar fashion, we have that



= − [ (( +  ·  )( ·  +  ) −  ( +  ))] .


(17)

Assuming that   0 (so returns on outsourced AGS are more decreasing as the amount
 grows), which implies that   0, this derivative is assured to be negative if  ≈ 0.
Noting that a pure end-of-pipe abatement technology would have  = 0, a third
proposition is now at hand.
Proposition 3: Suppose the opportunity cost of managerial attention for doing abatement in-house increases (i.e.   0, while  = 0,   0 and  +  ·   0).
Then (assuming   0,   0), AGS procurement increases and internal abatement
declines, the latter provided the eco-industry oﬀers what are basically end-of-pipe solutions.
This statement gives a rationale for the fact that, by and large, the eco-industry mostly
concentrates on supplying end-of-pipe abatement devices [see Sinclair-Desgagné (2008)].
Over the last decades, increased competitive pressure (owing notably to globalization)
and what was to become conventional wisdom across business [thanks in particular to
Prahalad and Hamel (1990)’s influential article] have made managerial time even scarcer.
This encouraged the externalization of abatement, especially when it is end-of-pipe and

14
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holds therefore little synergy with a polluting firm’s production.
3.4 More outsourcing of abatement stems from “the extent of the market”
Finally, economists have noticed some time ago that bigger markets foster specialization. Let us first examine this proposition when the output market expands, which
corresponds to the Smith-Stigler’s case. Throughout this subsection, we assume that
 = 0 (which implies that  = 0), so no synergy exists between in-house and outsourced abatement,   0 and  =  ·  ·  ≤ 0. A higher price  now truly indicates
that the output market has increased, for we have that



=  [( +  ·  )( ·  +  )]  0 .


(18)

Consider at present the other derivatives:



= − [( +  ·  )( ·  +  )] ;


(19)


= − [( +  ·  )( +  )] .


(20)



The latter has the predicted positive sign if   0, i.e. if the abater does not solely
oﬀer pure end-of-pipe abatement solutions; otherwise,




= 0 (for  = 0 when  = 0).

This constitutes an interesting qualification of the Smith-Stigler theorem (one which is,
furthermore, specific to this environmental context): end-of-pipe pollution abatement
not being a productive input, an extension of the downstream market (everything else
remaining constant) may then not aﬀect its level.
In the same vein, the sign of




depends on that of  +  ·  . One may have




0

15
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when  is negative (or even when  is smaller than − ·  ). This will happen if
more in-house abatement eﬀorts actually decrease the marginal cost of production. Such
a situation may not be fully unrealistic, considering for instance some new evidence in
support of the so-called "Porter hypothesis" [see Ambec and Lanoie (2008) for a recent
assessment of this much-debated view].7
This yields another proposition.
Proposition 4: Suppose the output market widens. Polluting firms will specialize by
procuring more AGS and doing less abatement themselves if outside AGS are increasingly
eﬀective and not purely end-of-pipe (  ,   0) and if in-house abatement conveys
a large opportunity cost (  +  ·   0).
Intuitively, the AGS market should also expand, inducing less in-house abatement and
more AGS outsourcing, following more stringent environmental regulation. Assume that
 +  ·   0 and  = 0 (meaning the abatement supplier’s technology is end-of-pipe,
which implies that  = 0). The immediate (and commonly accepted) eﬀect of a higher
emission tax is to reduce production:8



= − [( ( +  ·  ) −  ( +  ·  ))( ·  +  )]  0 .


Computing the corresponding expressions for





and


,


(21)

moreover, gives


= − [(− ( +  ·  ) +  ( +  ·  ))( ·  +  )]  0


(22)

7

The Porter hypothesis says that certain actions commanded by stricter environmental regulation can
improve both environmental performance and market competitiveness. To be fair, we must say that this
situation was a priori excluded in Stigler (1951)’s argument.
8

Indeed, the Porter Hypothesis does not hold in this case since   0.
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= − [( +  )2 ].


In-house abatement thus tends to increase, but the sign of




(23)
is actually uncertain since

 =  ·   0 and   0. If  is large enough (compared to the outsourced technology’s eﬀectiveness  ), demand for external AGS is inelastic and the abater can then
exert significant market power; in this case it may actually turn out, not unreasonably,
that




 0 so polluting firms will do less AGS outsourcing. Our last proposition now

follows:
Proposition 5: Consider an increase in the emission tax. Then (supposing  +· 
0 and  =  = 0) in-house abatement always increases, but purchases of AGS may go
down if the abater can thereby exert large market power.
This proposition means that environmental policy may not only aﬀect the structure of the
eco-industry [David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005)] but also the organization of polluting
firms [a possibility initially explored in Sinclair-Desgagné (1994)]. This and the above
have policy implications which will now be discussed.
4. Policy implications
From a public policy standpoint, the results derived in the previous section have the
following ramifications.
First, our model embeds two distinct instruments of environmental regulation: the
emission tax , of course, which level can be set by a regulator who maximizes some
form of social welfare, and the quality of external abatement  that the regulator may
want to set at some level (particularly when, by comparison, the emission tax involves
17
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high administrative or political costs). Each instrument entails specific compliance costs
through its own influence on the provision of AGS. In the previous section, a higher
emission tax induced higher abatement costs (since   0); subsection 3.2, on the other
hand, showed that outsourced AGS are cheaper when they are more eﬀective (for   0).
As we noticed early on, a positive emission tax  is necessary to generate some control
of polluting emissions in the first place. Our findings suggest, however, that compliance
with environmental policy might be aided by also promoting the delivery of better AGS.
Secondly, the eco-industry is increasingly becoming - not necessarily for environmental
reasons, one has to admit - an explicit target for industrial policy [see Ernst and Young
(2006), Kojima (2008), People’s Daily Online (2006), and US Department of Commerce
(2001) for perspectives from Europe, Japan, China and the United States respectively].
The present analysis may shed light on the relative merits of two alternative instruments
to foster environmental innovation. On the one hand, the quality standard  might
correspond to the amount of resources (i.e. government subsidies) devoted to productinnovation in order to bring to the market more eﬀective AGS; on the other hand, the
parameter  ’s level may be proportional to the amount of resources directed at processinnovation, which aims to reduce the cost of producing AGS. Since




and




are both

positive, raising either  or  will enhance the eco-industry’s market.9
For the eco-industry to expand and prosper with minimal public help, however, one
must again look at the value of outsourced AGS versus in-house abatement. As we just
9

As shown in David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2009), moreover, combining the emission tax  with
appropriate subsidies to the eco-industry might also yield a first-best allocation of resources.
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saw in the preceding section, a larger eco-industry does not fall automatically from more
stringent environmental regulation. Other factors play a role as well, such as the opportunity cost of in-house abatement and whether the AGS supplier holds significant market
power. Interestingly, the size of the output market can also matter: as Proposition 4
shows, when the abater oﬀers “cleaner production” technologies (which seek to directly
modify the production process, as opposed to end-of-pipe approaches), both the downstream market and that for AGS tend to grow or shrink together. This suggests that,
when downstream output goes down (because the economy experiences a downturn, say),
government support should aim for the cleaner-production segment of the eco-industry.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper oﬀers a first attempt at explaining the widespread and growing practice of
AGS outsourcing. Beyond the necessary environmental policies (an emission tax, in this
case), access to cheaper and better abatement technology, and more pressure on polluters
to focus on core business activities, lead polluting firms to rely further on a specialized
eco-industry for the needed means of emission control. The expansion of the output
market was also seen to make polluters procure more AGS and do less emission control
by themselves [as originally predicted by Stigler (1951) and Adam Smith], provided such
AGS are not end-of-pipe (a qualification of the Smith-Stigler’s theorem which is specific to
the environmental goods and services sector), the opportunity cost of in-house abatement
is large and the AGS supplier’s market power (which is largely determined by the choice
of environmental regulation) is limited.
19
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The current model, however, did not allow to investigate one last important rationale
for AGS outsourcing, which is the opportunity for polluters to thereby share the risk of
noncompliance and legal liability. Stylized facts about the eco-industry seem to go here
against transaction costs economics [as exposed, for instance, in Lafontaine and Slade
(2007), Klein (2005), Whinston (2003), and Williamson (1975, 1985)]: while complying
with environmental regulations often involves specific investments, intricate know-how
and unforeseeable contingent actions, the current trend is clearly not towards the internalization of AGS by polluting firms. The property rights approach [Hart (1995)], on the
other hand, seems particularly relevant. Take, for instance, the following statement from
Blocki (2002):
Outsourcing can make the contractor a full financial partner with contractual responsibilities for compliance, including reimbursement of any fines and
penalties for non-compliance. (...) Although the contractor cannot be held
responsible for any criminal liability that arises, this joint "ownership" can
provide maximum benefits to the environment.
This amounts to saying that AGS outsourcing enables a polluting firm to make the abatement supplier a residual claimant in matters of environmental compliance. In agreement
with the theory, "(...) the interests and motivations of the contractor can thereby be
closely aligned." [Blocki (2002)]
This research could be extended in a number of ways. For instance, one should allow
a monopolistic abatement supplier to set nonlinear prices and a regulator to use nonlinear taxes. Other typical issues of outsourcing, such as negotiation and renegotiation
between parties, asymmetric information and moral hazard should be considered. Since
this paper carried out what is mainly a positive analysis of the eco-industry, predictions
20
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should be tested empirically, and further normative considerations, such as the optimal
environmental and/or industrial policies dealing with an expanding eco-industry, should
be searched for. One should also examine a framework in which there is imperfect competition between polluters and/or between AGS suppliers; in this context, the respective
incentives and bargaining power of polluting and abating firms would enter the analysis of
a polluter’s make-or-buy decision. Considering an oligopolistic eco-industry could finally
highlight some key issues on the organization of environmental R&D, such as the degree of
cooperation to allow between pollution abaters; as Poyago-Theotoky (2007) pointed out,
this extension may not constitute a straightforward application of the actual R&D literature, since taking environmental externalities into account brings in additional market
failures.
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Appendix
The following table summarizes our mathematical assumptions and results.
The eﬀect of
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The eﬀec t of 
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